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Water Policy Making in Scotland: Political Demands and Economic Pressures 
 
Antonio A. R. Ioris 
 
University of Aberdeen1 
 
In the last few years, water management has been changing from rigid rules and 
prescriptive controls in favour of more flexible and comprehensive responses. In the 
European Union, water management has been in a process of rapid transformation, 
particularly after the approval, in 2000, of the Water Framework Directive (WFD). The 
Directive has important repercussions for water use and conservation and brings 
additional demands to official agencies and concerned stakeholders. The introduction of 
the new regulatory regime is not immune from controversy and disputes, but, on the 
contrary, it has spurred a growing politicisation of water management issues (Page and 
Kaika, 2003). As in the rest of Europe, the introduction of water reforms in Scotland has 
been a contested experience in which private and public sectors clash and collaborate 
according to multiple agendas. Its close association with political Devolution further 
amplifies the politicisation of water reforms in Scotland. After nearly three centuries of a 
monolithic government system, a Scottish administration holds, since 1999, control over 
a range of public matters. Environmental regulation is one of the devolved areas of public 
administration, which means overseeing WFD in 1/3 of the British territory. Yet there are 
still overlaps and uncertainties in many areas directly or indirectly related to the 
environment, as in the case of energy generation (e.g. hydropower), where public policies 
are still a prerogative of London, but planning authorisations are decided in Edinburgh. 
The transition from a previously centralised UK government to a re-established 
Scottish administration has had important political, material and symbolic consequences 
for dealing with water problems in Scotland. Before Devolution, it was significantly more 
difficult to reform the Scottish law due to a shortage of parliamentarian time (in 
Westminster). After Devolution, the restricted importance of Scottish issues in the UK 
political arena is now compensated by the mobilisation of time and resources in the 
Scottish Parliament (Hendry, 2006). Crucially, the coincidence between the approval of 
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WFD in the European Union and the reinvention of the Scottish administration has 
favoured the exploitation of water reforms as a strategic political asset. By cleverly 
articulating a sense of national pride around the introduction of the water legislation, the 
young parliamentarian structure tried to ascertain its political vision and operative 
efficiency. The fact that, in 2003, Scotland was the first region to translate WFD into 
national legislation was praised as a proof that the infant public sector can do things 
‘faster and better’. Not only the possibility to tailor the legislation to the Scottish needs 
has improved, but the mechanisms of political representation also changed considerably. 
The focus of stakeholder mobilisation shifted from London to Edinburgh, prompting a 
new range of alliances and cooperation around parliamentarian activities (Ison and 
Watson, 2007). The involvement of key stakeholder groups played an important role in 
shaping the new legislation, but without necessarily resulting into stronger democratic 
representation. On the contrary, lobbying and bargaining have exposed a highly 
controlled process of collective learning and public involvement.  
Scotland has historically been a divided country, a nation characterised by splits 
between Highlands and Lowlands, west and east, urban and rural, Protestants and 
Catholics, all factors that work to dissipate Scottish national identity and compromise its 
future prospects. In the decades that preceded Devolution, economic and political 
disputes led to an aggravation of social and geographical divisions (Danson, 1999). Amid 
such important challenges, Devolution represented a unique opportunity to recreate 
Scottish territorial unity by changing legal, symbolic and administrative configurations. 
As observed by Swyngedouw (2000), the resurrection of the regional and local scales of 
governance is part of the broader myth of ‘globalisation’ that junks existing spatial 
configurations and scales of governance and produces new ones in the process. Due to 
the political synergies between WFD and Devolution, water management reforms 
became an important component of a ‘double scissor’ of territorialisation and 
deterritorialisation. To be sure, water management needs to be territorialised, given the 
unique geographical characteristics of regions and catchments. The territorial 
management of water should, therefore, reflect local social and environmental 
circumstances without becoming the object of exogenous political expedients. However, 
the legitimating demands of the newborn Scottish State have given rise to a politically 
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asymmetric territorialisation of the water reforms. Instead of an even-handed reform, 
which focused on ecological and social goals, the introduction of WFD in Scotland has 
intensified long-term divisions, to the detriment of its formal objectives of sustainable 
water management.  
The asymmetry associated to the water reforms is evident from the fact that the 
stronger groups of water users (hydropower, water industry, distilleries, larger farmers, 
etc.) and stronger economic regions (industrial areas, whisky production valleys, tourism 
hotspots, irrigation clusters, etc.) have been able to exert sustained pressure in decisive 
moments of WFD implementation. The influence of stronger players has been 
instrumental to contain the possibilities and prospects of the new regulatory regime. 
Because of its emblematic relevance, the implementation of WFD should have triggered 
a proper accountability for the mistakes created past by the private appropriation of 
common water resources. However, the tacit agreement between stronger groups and the 
State apparatus has maintained the reforms within narrow objectives. Instead of allowing 
effective solutions to long-term impacts, the asymmetric territorialisation of water 
reforms has meant only restricted adjustments and circumscribed changes in existing 
activities. In practice, rather than restoring the quality of the water environment per se 
and for the benefit of the entire nation, the new regulation aims mainly the rectification of 
problems in areas with marked economic or political importance. 
The politically asymmetric territorialisation of water management is constantly 
reinforced by the mechanisms of public involvement in the WFD implementation. It is in 
the spirit of WFD the increase the degree of stakeholder involvement, based on the 
principle that decisions should be taken at the level of administration that is ‘as close as 
possible to the citizen’. However, the governance mechanisms conferred by Devolution 
transferred responsibilities from London to Edinburgh without cascading the decision 
power to the lower, local level of decision-making (i.e. catchment settlements and smaller 
towns). As it happened, stakeholders have participated mainly via the restricted space of 
public consultations. Although there is a duty to consider the representations made during 
the consultation, the government has ample discretion to accept or reject any suggestion. 
The situation is common in other parts of Europe, where public involvement has been 
manipulated according to political interests, without really moving European citizens 
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much ‘closer’ to environmental regulation (Jordan, 2000). Likewise, other opportunities 
for public involvement, related to the preparation of the River Basin Management Plans, 
similarly replicate the same biased pattern of public involvement. Apart from the one-
sided decisions about the membership in the discussion groups (participants are selected 
by a ‘structured approach’ adopted by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency - 
SEPA), the role of the participants is merely consultative and their inputs are limited to 
fine-tuning the production of the RBMP. Members are invited to engage (and validate) a 
structured form of public involvement, on SEPA’s own terms, whist the majority of the 
catchment population and smaller organisations remain either unaware of the procedures 
or lack means to take part in the process. It means that the involvement of the public is 
being, once more, reduced to a series of meetings with a fixed schedule of activities.  
The tacit importance assigned to WFD in Scotland has been instrumental to 
reduce the anomy and suspicion of the general public about the new regulation. As in 
other countries, public involvement has become an element of propaganda and political 
legitimisation. However, the recurrent emphasis on the importance of WFD to Scotland 
conceals the historical causes of environmental problems and the asymmetric balance of 
power. Water reforms have ultimately become entangled with the reaffirmation of the 
‘Scottish myth’ (cf. McCrone, 2001), according to which there is an inherent 
egalitarianism among the Scots. The myth is in direct contradiction with a highly unequal 
society that has failed to achieve minimal levels of civilised life to all its members. It is 
not because environmental laws improved after Devolution that environmental 
management necessarily changed on the ground. On the contrary, if it is true that WFD 
raised awareness about water problems, serious barriers remain unresolved or were 
discursively magnified. The problem is demonstrated by the limited opportunities for the 
creative involvement of water stakeholders.  
Another important area of contention is the assessment of environmental impacts 
and formulation of solutions. WFD is, by definition, a ‘framework’ type of legislation, 
which means that it systematises the direction that European countries should follow. 
Within reasonable technical boundaries, member countries can interpret the Directive 
requirements in order to restore water bodies to ‘good ecological status’. If the current 
condition deviates from good status, a series of measures must be in place to guarantee 
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environmental restoration by 2015. The regime seems supple enough, but the devil here 
is in the detail: only those measures that are ‘proportionate’ and ‘feasible’ are legally 
enforced. Because the regulators can only impose (economically) informed and 
(politically) defensible conditions to water users, there is a legitimate route for the 
avoidance or, at least, minimisation of the financial costs associated to mitigation 
measures.  
The use of ‘rational’ analytical tools to justify positioned water management 
decisions is certainly not new in Scotland, but the disputes about proportional and 
disproportional mitigation costs has further immersed the WFD agenda in a highly 
monetised game. If during the Industrial Revolution water became a source and 
repository of private profits, the WFD regime has established that the management of 
water should be based on a rational and cost-effective mitigation of impacts. That is 
argued despite the fact that there is no empirical evidence that monetisation really 
improves environmental management. On the contrary, the economic exacerbation of 
water is ultimately an attempt to solve the historical problems of commodification via 
additional processes of nature commodification. The ‘cash nexus’ (cf. Foster, 2002) 
inevitably leads to an exacerbation of the economic features of managed water systems, 
at the expense of other social and cultural dimensions. 
The reform of water management in Scotland has provided an invaluable 
opportunity to grasp the connections between territorial politics, environmental 
vulnerability and economic pressures. The reliance on the generic assessment of 
ecological processes and the quick-fix solution to long-term impacts betray the 
technocratic basis of the new water management approaches. That is directly related to 
the hegemonic discourse of ‘free markets’ and private ownership of natural resources. In 
effect, the dominant forms of dealing with water remain bound by market assumptions 
about how nature operates and what purpose it serves. The economic imperatives behind 
water use inevitably lead to a wasteful consumption of water and water-related resources, 
such as electricity, which has been rarely questioned during the introduction of the new 
regulatory regime. The best that WFD can offer is a search for efficiency and 
rationalisation, ignoring the difficult questions about the ultimately need to expand 
domestic or industrial water demand. Needless to say that such a movement is in 
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accordance with the prominence given by Devolution to economic growth and private 
business interests.  
Overall, the WFD approaches to water management in Scotland have been greatly 
constrained by the political and economic priorities of Devolution, which tend to 
overlook the long chain of connections between problems at the catchment level and 
processes operating at broader geographical scales. While most user sectors (agriculture 
is the exception) are likely to increase significantly the use of water during the 
implementation of WFD, the new regulation is incapable of dealing with the close 
relationship between poor water quality and social deprivation in other marginalized 
areas. As pointed out by Frodeman (2006), today policies embodies positivist and 
proceduralist biases “in that is seeks to rationalize and make more efficient the expression 
of our values, while abstaining from the project of making these values themselves more 
reasonable”. Although some localised and patchy improvements are expected as result of 
WFD, the introduction of an economic-based regulation will continue to raise tensions 
and contradictions. So far, the key outcomes of the WFD experience have been an 
unnecessary complexification of water management and the widespread use of the money 
language. If in the past, water development was responsible for serious disruptive 
interventions (e.g. dam construction), the contemporary water reforms have refuelled 
conflicts and deepened uncertainties.  
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